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On 25 October 2009, shortly after 4.30 pm, the appellant (H) was 
travelling east from Carlisle on the A69 single-carriageway road 
towards Newcastle upon Tyne, when his vehicle was involved in a 
collision with another vehicle, driven by the victim (D). This 
collision had resulted in D suffering serious injuries, and upon 
being taken to hospital, D later died from those injuries. Prior to 
the collision, D had been working on the west coast of Scotland 
where he had worked a series of 12-hour night shifts and was 
driving back to Newcastle upon Tyne. At the time of the collision 
he had driven around 230 miles of a 400-mile journey. 
Additionally, it was found that D was a drug user and a significant 
quantity of heroin and other controlled drugs were found in the 
blood analysis after the incident. Before the collision occurred 
between the two vehicles, witnesses had stated that D had been 
driving erratically for some time and had drifted off the road both 
at the nearside and across to the wrong side of the centre white 
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line. Further witness evidence stated that an oncoming vehicle had 
to swerve to avoid being hit by D, who was driving on the wrong 
side of the road at the time. H was driving at a speed of 
approximately 45–55 mph in a 60 mph speed limit as he rounded 
a right-hand bend on the correct side of the road when the vehicle 
driven by D headed towards him. H tried to steer away from D’s 
vehicle, but D took no avoiding action. It was accepted 
subsequently that H’s driving had been faultless and D was entirely 
responsible for the collision which caused his death. 
 
At the time of the accident, H was driving uninsured and without a 
full driving licence, his licence having been revoked previously on 
medical grounds. Subsequently, H had passed a medical test and 
was, at the time of the collision, able to drive under a provisional 
licence although had not yet obtained a full driving licence. H was 
charged under the offence created by s. 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 
1988, inserted by s. 21(1) of the Road Safety Act 2006. Section 3ZB 
states, inter alia, that a person is guilty of an offence if he causes 
the death of another person by driving a motor vehicle on a road 
and, at the time when he is driving, the circumstances are such that 
he is committing an offence contrary to s. 143 of the 1988 Act 
(using a motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third 
party risks) or s. 87(1) of the 1988 Act (driving otherwise in 
accordance with a licence). Prosecution for the offences under s. 
143 and s. 87(1) can result in punishment of a fine, penalty points 
and disqualification from driving. When convicted under s. 3ZB, a 
person can be liable to imprisonment for up to two years. 
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At the trial at first instance, Newcastle Crown Court heard that H 
was to be prosecuted for the two offences under s. 3ZB, causing 
death by driving unlicensed (s. 3ZB(a)) and causing death whilst 
being uninsured (s. 3ZB(c)) rather than being prosecuted for the 
two separate offences under s. 147 and s. 87 of the 1988 Act. The 
Recorder of Newcastle Crown Court held that H’s driving had not 
caused D’s death, and that D was entirely responsible for his own 
death. The Crown appealed ([2011] EWCA Crim 1508) challenging 
the ruling of the Recorder that ‘as a matter of law, a jury could not 
reasonably be directed that in any real sense the defendant was a 
cause of the death of D’ (at [5]). The Court of Appeal, however, 
considered itself bound by the decision in R v Williams [2010] 
EWCA Crim 2552, insofar as it was not an element of the offence 
that a defendant’s driving had to exhibit any fault contributing to 
the accident. It was sufficient enough that a defendant was 
uninsured, driving without a licence or disqualified, and that his car 
had been involved in the fatal collision.  
 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found, under s. 3ZB of the 1988 
Act, H was criminally responsible for the death of D, as the offence 
did not require that there be anything wrong with the defendant’s 
driving. The Court of Appeal maintained that the wording in s. 3ZB 
was sufficiently clear to establish Parliament’s intention that 




H appealed to the Supreme Court, the question for determination 
being whether a driver charged under s. 3ZB caused death 
whenever he was on the road and a fatal accident involving his 
vehicle occurred, or whether he only caused it if he did, or omitted 
to do, something connected to the control of his vehicle which was 
open to proper criticism and contributed in some more than 
minimal way to the death.  
 
Held, allowing the appeal, under s. 3ZB it is not necessary for 
the Crown to prove careless or inconsiderate driving, but there 
must be something open to proper criticism in the driving of the 
defendant, beyond the mere presence of his vehicle on the road, 
and which contributed in some more than minimal way to the 
death. Parliament might have intended to make s. 3ZB an 
aggravated form of the offence of having no insurance or driving 
without a licence, but the court felt that it was unclear whether 
that intention extended to attaching criminal responsibility for a 
death to a defendant whose driving was blameless beyond being 
in a motor vehicle, driving without insurance or a licence, or being 
subject to disqualification.  
 
The court recognised that the law frequently had to distinguish 
between the conduct without which the resulting consequences 
would not have occurred (the ‘but for’ test) and a legally effective 
cause of the deaths. By the test of common sense outlined in Galoo 
Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) [1994] 1 WLR 1360, H had 
created the opportunity for his car to be run into by D, but what 
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brought about the death of D was his own dangerous driving and 
driving under the influence of drugs.  
It was a matter of the merest chance that H’s car was what D hit. 
He might just as easily have hit a tree, which would have been a 
similar intervening event, yet it would not be said that the death 
had been caused by the planting of the tree. (at [25]) 
Their Lordships stated that if, in creating liability for a homicide 
offence, Parliament wished to go beyond the recognised common 
law approach to causation, then unambiguous language must be 
used in the statute to do this. It was concluded that by using the 
words ‘causes death by driving’ in s. 3ZB of the 1988 Act, 
Parliament had not chosen such unambiguous language. 
Therefore, it was held that s. 3ZB requires at least some act or 
omission which involves some element of fault. It was held in the 
present case that there was nothing in the manner of H’s driving 
that contributed in any way to the death. 
Commentary 
 
The issues faced by the Supreme Court in this appeal from the 
Court of Appeal occur at the crossroads between public policy (in 
respect of those who advocate a robust policy in respect of road 
safety to deal with socalled ‘drivers who kill’), causation and 
statutory interpretation. Clearly, it is the manifest duty of every 
driver to maintain a valid certificate of insurance; this duty is 
imposed by means of Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 143. Similarly s. 
83(1) of the 1988 Act requires all drivers to comply with the terms 
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of their driving licence. The creation of the offence under s. 3ZB 
was introduced alongside another offence of causing death by 
careless or inconsiderate driving. This was inserted into the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 by s. 20(1) of the Road Safety Act 2006 as s. 2B. 
The s. 3ZB offence was intended to address the perception that the 
‘penalty for uninsured driving could readily be seen to fail to cope 
adequately with bad cases … for serial offenders’ especially where 
the uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified driver had caused the 
death of another road user. In this case, however, it appeared that 
H was being punished under a homicide offence for the dangerous 
driving of D despite the availability of charges under s. 83 and s. 
143 of the 1988 Act. 
Intervening acts and s. 3ZB 
 
The offence of driving without insurance is one of strict liability, 
the scope of prohibited activity, therefore, covers not only those, 
like H, who knowingly drive uninsured and not in accordance with 
their licence, but also those who are uninsured due to a mistake 
on the part of the insurance company or those who disregard or 
overlook an insurance renewal notice. Lord Hughes and Lord 
Toulson, delivering the judgment of the court, emphasised the 
gravity of the s. 3ZB offence, stating that the offence was 
considered to belong to the category of homicide offences and as 
such, ‘… if the ruling in the present case is correct, all such persons 
will be guilty of a very serious offence of causing death by driving 
if a fatal collision ensues, even if they could have done nothing to 
avoid it’ (at [9]). 
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The previous appeal by the Crown to the Court of Appeal in this 
case led to a number of distinguished commentators criticising 
both the drafting of the statute and the apparent relish with which 
the Court of Appeal had adopted a broad interpretation of the 
language of the statute. Sullivan and Simester provided a 
comprehensive discussion on the issues of causation raised within 
the Court of Appeal’s decision and noted that by drafting s. 3ZB in 
the terms that it had done, Parliament had not sufficiently 
decoupled causation from personal responsibility. By requiring 
that the defendant ‘causes the death of another person’, they 
argued that the normal legal principles of causation apply and that 
the blameworthiness of the driver needed to be more than his 
presence on the road in an uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified 
state (G. R. Sullivan and A. P. Simester, ‘Causation Without Limits: 
Causing Death While Driving Without a Licence, While Disqualified, 
or Without Insurance’ [2012] Crim LR 753).  
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in this case makes 
considerable reference to these ‘normal legal principles of 
causation’. First, when considering the chain of causation between 
H’s driving and the death of D, the appellant argued that D, by 
being under the influence of drugs and not in a fit state to drive, 
had committed a voluntary and informed act which had broken the 
chain of causation. The court highlighted the case, familiar to all 
students of criminal law, of R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38 
where the victim of a voluntary drugs overdose was held to be 
solely responsible in law for his own death, despite being handed 
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a loaded syringe by the defendant. The court accepted that, in the 
current case, D did not choose voluntarily to kill himself; instead 
he drove dangerously and caused the collision which caused the 
injuries that ultimately killed him. If the driving of H was a cause 
that was more than minimal (the principle of de minimis shown in 
R v Hennigan [1971] 1 All ER 133), then the court held that issues 
of independent acts and omissions as in Kennedy would not assist 
H. It is difficult to conclude anything other than the collision in 
which D was killed was a decisive factor rather than minimal. The 
question for their Lordships to consider was, therefore, whether H 
was, in law, a cause of the death of D simply by being present on 
the road. 
Causation and fault: challenging the Williams orthodoxy 
 
In the present case the Court of Appeal had considered that it was 
bound by the (then) recent decision in R v Williams (Jason John) 
[2010] EWCA Crim 2552, which appeared to decide conclusively 
that the mere presence of the defendant on the road, without 
suitable insurance, licence or being subject to disqualification, was 
sufficient to be held to cause the death of the victim. It was not an 
element of the offence that the defendant had exhibited any fault 
in contributing to the accident and, indeed, it did not matter that 
the defendant may have been blameless. It was enough that he 
was uninsured and involved in a fatal collision for the offence to 
be complete. The facts of Williams are slightly different in that the 
defendant (W) was driving uninsured on an urban dual 
carriageway, within the speed limit. A pedestrian (V) jumped over 
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the central reservation and into the path of the car. It was agreed 
at trial that W could have done nothing to avoid hitting V and that 
V was the principal cause of his own death. The judge at first 
instance and the subsequent judgment of the Court of Appeal 
supported the interpretation of s. 3ZB that fault in the manner of 
driving was not an element of the offence and that the presence 
of W’s vehicle, uninsured, unlicensed or disqualified would be a 
cause of death of V.  
 
The decision of the court in Williams placed causation issues within 
the sphere of the ‘but for’ test. Counsel for H in the present case 
decided that the issue of fault was something of a blind alley and 
instead concentrated upon the meaning of ‘causes death by 
driving’. The Supreme Court accepted the appellant’s submission 
that rather than merely finding that the presence of H’s vehicle on 
the road was a ‘but for’ event which caused the death of D, a 
common-sense approach would see H as the legal cause of D’s 
death only when there was some additional feature of the driving 
which was blameworthy (citing Glidewell LJ in Galoo Ltd v Bright 
Grahame Murray (a firm) [1994] 1 WLR 1360). In this case, it was 
successfully argued that the legal cause of D’s death was the 
dangerous driving and druginduced state of D, and that H was 
entirely faultless. Their Lordships stated (at [32]) that there must 
be something more than ‘but for’ causation. It may well be that in 
many cases the driving would amount to careless or inconsiderate 
driving, but it might not do so in every case. As was articulated 
earlier in the judgment: 
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By the test of common sense, whilst the driving by H created the 
opportunity for his car to be run into by D, what brought about 
the latter’s death was his own dangerous driving under the 
influence of drugs. It was a matter of the merest chance that 
what he hit when he veered onto the wrong side of the road for 
the last of several times was the oncoming vehicle which H was 
driving. He might just as easily have gone off the road and hit a 
tree, in which case nobody would suggest that his death was 
caused by the planting of the tree, although that too would have 
been a sine qua non. (at [25]) 
Statutory interpretation and s. 3ZB 
 
The issue of statutory interpretation runs parallel with the 
consideration of causation issues in relation to s. 3ZB. Their 
Lordships stated that the rule of construction that applied to penal 
legislation was analogous to the principle of legality as explained 
by Lord Hoffmann in Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p. Simms and O’Brien [2000] 2 AC 115: 
 
The principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely 
confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. 
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that 
the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have 
passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of 
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express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the 
courts therefore presume that even the most general words 
were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. 
(at [131]) 
 
Although Ex p. Simms and O’Brien was concerned with a breach of 
human rights, it was held that, similarly, the gravity of a conviction 
for homicide was such that if Parliament wished to displace the 
normal approach to causation recognised by the common law and 
substitute a different rule, it had to do so unambiguously. This was 
the approach suggested by Sullivan and Simester and one 
accepted by the Supreme Court. It was held that Parliament had 
chosen not to adopt unequivocal language (other constructions of 
the offence which had been suggested are within the judgment (at 
[34])) and, therefore, an intention to create the meaning 
contended for by the Crown could not be attributed to it. The 2005 
Home Office Consultation Paper stated that: 
 
… the mere fact of taking a vehicle on a road when disqualified 
is, in the Government’s view, as negligent of the safety of others 
as is any example of driving below the standard of a competent 
driver even if the disqualified driver at a particular time is driving 
at an acceptable standard. (Home Office Consultation Paper, 
Review of Road Traffic Offences Involving Bad Driving, February 
3, 2005, para. 4.2) 
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It is clear from the decision in this case, however, that the Supreme 
Court does not believe the wording of the eventual offence was 
sufficiently equivocal as to impose a homicide conviction upon a 
driver who, other than lacking a valid insurance or driving licence, 
was entirely blameless. The offence under s. 3ZB may well be part 
of an attempt by the government to provide a robust response to 
uninsured, unlicensed and disqualified drivers. All those interested 
in road safety would concede the necessity of this. In the current 
case, however, the Supreme Court has moved to restrict the extent 
to which such zealotry could interfere with the operation of 
normative criminal law principles and thereby constrain 
disproportionate and unjust sentencing imposed as the result of 
cosmetic and political imperatives.  
 
